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In many instances, the order indicating that a lawsuit may proceed
as a class action determines whether the suit will proceed at all. This
note examines the rationale behind Florida courts’ treatment of orders
determining class standing.
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Appellate Review of Class Standing Orders in Florida
In many instances, the order indicating that a lawsuit may proceed
as a class action determines whether the suit will proceed at all. This
note examines the rationale behind Florida courts' treatment of orders
determining class standing. Preliminarily, this note focuses on the pre-
sent status of class standing orders in federal courts. Federal judges
have the option of either certifying the suit as class action or refusing
class action certification.1 In either event, the federal trial court judge's
discretion in certifying or refusing to certify a class action suit is not
appealable except in rare cases which will be discussed below.
In Florida the law is unsettled in this area. A Florida judge has
the same option of class action certification as his federal counterpart.2
Differences arise, however, in that the Florida judge may order all alle-
gations of a class suit stricken from the complaint or may dismiss the
complaint entirely.3
After treatment of the federal viewpoint of class action certifica-
tion orders, the focus of this note will shift to the effect a Florida
judge's choice of action will have on whether a class action order is
appealable.
Appeal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 in Federal Courts
Congress, by statute, created the federal appellate court power to
hear final lower court decisions on appeal. Generally, federal appellate
courts hear appeals only from final judgments. However, because of the
harshness sometimes associated with strict adherence to the final judg-
ment rule, federal courts have created certain exceptions such as the
collateral order doctrine.5
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
2. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220.
3. id.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970). "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of
appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States .... " Id.
5. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
1
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[Some decisions appear] to fall in that small class which finally
determines claims of rights separate from, and collateral to, rights
asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too
independent of the cause itself to require that appellate considera-
tion be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.'
While this exception to the final judgment rule is approved by the
United States Supreme Court, the Court specifically rejected its use
regarding class standing orders in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay.7 The
grounds for such a rejection were threefold. First, these orders are sub-
ject to revisions in the district courts as part of the federal class action
rule provides for amendment or alteration of a class standing order any
time prior to final judgment on the merits.8 Second, the considerations
involved in determining whether a suit should proceed as a class action
are "enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff's
cause of action."9 Third, review can effectively be achieved after final
judgment at the behest of the named representative or intervening class
members. 10
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals formulated another excep-
tion to the final judgment rule dealing specifically with class action cer-
tification denials called the "death-knell" doctrine.' This exception al-
lowed for immediate appeal when denial of class certification would
"for all practical purposes terminate the litigation,"' 2 thereby causing
irreparable harm to the plaintiff and the class.' 3 Other circuits viewed
the "death-knell" doctrine with mixed responses. Both the Eighth Cir-
cuit and the Tenth Circuit accepted the "death-knell" doctrine'4 while
6. Id. at 546.
7. 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
8. Id. at 469.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 1035 (1967).
12. Id. at 121.
13. Id. In Korn v. Franchard Corp., 443 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971), the court
dropped the requirement that the class suffer irreparable harm and just looked to the
named representative.
14. The death knell doctrine of the Second Circuit was accepted by the Eighth
Circuit in Hartmann v. Scott, 488 F.2d 1215, 1220 (8th Cir. 1973) and the Tenth
6:1982 1
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the Third and Seventh Circuits rejected it altogether. 5
The United States Supreme Court, however, killed the "death-
knell" doctrine in Coopers.6 In that case, Coopers & Lybrand, an ac-
counting firm, certified that financial statements contained in a pro-
spectus were correct. Relying upon the prospectus, respondents pur-
chased shares in a company. The company later restated its earnings
reported in the prospectus by writing down its net income. Thereafter,
respondents sold their shares and sustained a loss of $2,650 on their
investment. Respondents brought a suit on behalf of themselves and the
class of similarly situated investors. Initially, the district court certified
the suit as a class action but later decertified it. The court of appeals
examined the amount of respondents' claims in relation to their
financial resources and the probable cost of litigation and concluded
that if class certification was not given the lawsuit would terminate.
Under this "death-knell" doctrine, jurisdiction was accepted and the
order decertifying the class was reversed.1 7
The United States Supreme Court disagreed and reasoned that an
order which either refuses to certify or decertifies the class does not
force the plaintiff to abandon his claim. Since the plaintiff is free to
pursue his individual claim, orders refusing to certify are not final judg-
ments and will be appealable only if they fall within an appropriate
exception to the final-judgment rule. 8
The Court, refusing to accept the "death-knell" doctrine as an ap-
propriate exception to the final judgment rule based its decision on five
reasons. First, the formation of an appellate rule which revolves around
the amount of the plaintiff's claim is a legislative responsibility.' 9 Con-
gress has made "finality" the test of appealability, and an amount in
controversy rule established by the Court would be arbitrary in that "it
ignores the variables that inform a litigant's decision to proceed, or not
Circuit in Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 490 F.2d 620, 624 (10th Cir.
1973).
15. Both the Third Circuit, in Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618, 621
(3d Cir. 1972), and the Seventh Circuit, in King v. Kansas City S. Indus., Inc., 479
F.2d 1259, 1260 (3d Cir. 1973), rejected the doctrine.
16. 437 U.S. 463. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion for a unanimous court.
17. Id. at 466.
18. Id. at 467.
19. Id. at 472.
3
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to proceed, in the face of an adverse class ruling."2 Second, acceptance
of the "death-knell" rule would have serious debilitating effects on the
administration of justice as further appeals from adverse rulings on
other grounds would inevitably result. 1 Third, the "death-knell" doc-
trine's acceptance would result in indiscriminatory interlocutory review
of the trial judge's decision. 22 Such indiscriminatory review would cir-
cumvent the purpose behind 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) which allows for re-
view only upon trial court's discretion and then only in special circum-
stances.2 Fourth, since the doctrine only applies to class certification
denial orders, it operates in favor of the plaintiffs even though the is-
sues will often be of critical importance to the defendants as well.24
Finally, by allowing appeals that turn on the particular facts of the
case, appellate courts would be thrown into the trial process in a way
which defeats one of the main purposes of the final judgment rule:
maintaining appropriate relationships between the various courts.25
Furthermore, the Court, in dicta, stated that approval of class certifica-
tions were interlocutory orders and not final judgments within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.20
While the Coopers decision settled the issue of appealing class
standing orders as final judgments, such appeals were not precluded
under other federal rules or statutes.
Injunctions
District court interlocutory orders concerning injunctive relief are
immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).17 In Brunson v.
Board of Trustees, 8 appeal of class certification denials were available
20. Id.
21. Id. at 473.
22. Id. at 474.
23. Id. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
24. Coopers, 437 U.S. at 476.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. This section provides: "(a) The court of appeals shall have jurisdiction of
appeal from: (1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States, ...
granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dis-
solve or modify injunctions . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)(1970).
28. Brunson v. Bd. of Trustees of School Dist. No. 1, 311 F.2d 107 (4th Cir.
4
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under Section 1291(a)(1) on the theory that a denial of class certifica-
tion would in effect narrow the scope of injunctive relief. 9 In Brunson,
an action was brought by forty-two black children and their parents
against the school board as a class action suit. Upon motion, the dis-
trict court struck all of the plaintiffs except Brunson who was the first
named plaintiff.30 By forcing each individual to pursue his own claim,
injunctions issued would only be directed with respect to that single
plaintiff whereas if class action were successful general injunctive relief
would be granted. Hence, the court concluded denial of class certifica-
tion had the effect of narrowing the scope of injunctive relief.31
In Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co.,32 the United
States Supreme Court, however, refused to accept this rationale by
holding an order denying class certification was not appealable under
the interlocutory injunctive relief statute.33 The court noted the statute
was created as an exception to the policy against piecemeal review and
as such should not be enlarged or extended. 34 Under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23, class certification orders may be reviewed by the
trial judge both prior to and after final judgment.3 5 Finally, the Court
concluded the class determination does not affect the merits of the rep-
resentative's personal claim nor does it pass on the legal sufficiency of
any claim for injunctive relief.36 In the event that the order did pass on
the legal sufficiency of a claim for injunctive relief or if it would effect
the merits of the petitioner's own claim, the Court left open the possi-
bility for review.37
1962).
29. Id. at 108. The same view has been taken in Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut.
Hosp. Ins., Inc., 522 F.2d 1235, 1237 (7th Cir. 1975), and Jones v. Diamond, 519 F.2d
1090, 1095 (5th Cir. 1975). Because the district court's refusal to certify the suit as a
class action directly controlled the subsequent disposition of the request for preliminary
injunction it too should be reviewable. Jenkins, 522 F.2d at 1237.
30. Brunson, 311 F.2d at 107.
31. Id.
32. 437 U.S. 478 (1978).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 480.
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).
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Appeal of Denial of Class Action Certification Under Federal
Rule 54(b)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)38 provides an alternative
way to appeal a denial of a class action certification. There have been
cases where a trial judge has dismissed the action as to the absent class
members and the judge certified the dismissal as a final judgment and
therefore appeal was appropriately taken.39
This rule may also be utilized if the action is dismissed against the
parties for reasons other than lack of class standing. 40 For example, in
Monarch Asphalt Sales Co. v. Wilshire Oil Co. of Texas,4 the trial
court refused class status to private contractors. The contractors at-
tempted to intervene in the suit but this was also denied. "Final judg-
ment" was entered against the contractors in accordance with rule
54(b). The order denying class status was held reviewable under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). "The general rule is [that] interloc-
utory orders from which no appeal lies are merged into the final judg-
ment and open to review on appeal from that judgment. '42
Since, the scope of rule 54(b) is limited to final judgment, and
interlocutory orders merged into final judgments, the rule cannot ex-
tend to reviewing decisions granting status to a class.43
38. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) states: "[W]hen multiple parties are involved, the
court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all the
claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for
delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment . .. ."
39. Windham v. American Brands, Inc., 539 F.2d 1016 (4th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 968 (1978), holding certification appropriate under FED. R. Civ. P.
54(b) to unnamed members of class upon denial of certification and final judgment of
dismissal against them. See also Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir.
1968) (dictum). But see West v. Capitol Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 558 F.2d 997, 980
(10th Cir. 1977), holding putative class members were not parties to the suit and de-
claring judgment dismissing action on behalf of the class void.
40. Monarch Asphalt Sales Co. v. Wilshire Oil Co. of Tex., 511 F.2d 1073 (10th
Cir. 1977).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1077.
43. Katz, 496 F.2d at 752.
6
Nova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 4 [1982], Art. 3
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol6/iss4/3
Class Standing Orders6:1982
Discretionary Appeal of Class Standing Determinations in
Federal Courts Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
In Coopers,4 the Supreme Court held that a class action certifica-
tion was not appealable under section 1291 as a final judgment, but
such a motion for appeal is not precluded under section 1292(b)." 5
Under this statute, when a district court judge determines that an issue
involves a controlling question of law on which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion and immediate appeal may materially
advance the ultimate termination of the suit, the question may be certi-
fied to the court of appeals. 6 The court of appeals may then exercise
its discretion as to whether to hear the appeal.47 Policy reasons for al-
lowing these appeals under section 1292(b) include judicial economy
and protection of the parties from erroneous interlocutory orders. 48
Due to the stringent requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), as an
interlocutory order, a class certification decision will be applicable only
in special circumstances. Such special circumstances were demon-
strated in Tucker v. Arthur Anderson & Co..49 The trial court, in
Tucker, stated that the order certifying a class could be considered a
"controlling question" because considerable time and expense would be
saved if the issue was immediately certified since reversal would proba-
bly mean termination of the suit.50
The same result was reached in Aschul v. Sitmar Cruises,5 1 where
a passenger on a fourteen day pleasure cruise brought an action on
behalf of himself and other passengers against the shipping line alleg-
ing the cruise had not stopped in all the ports announced in its itiner-
44. 437 U.S. 463.
45. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 336 n.8 (1980).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
47. Id. This section is only used for orders that would not ordinarily be immedi-
ately appealable. "In some cases such appeal would promise substantial savings of time
and resources or for other reasons should be viewed hospitably." Roper, 445 U.S. at
336 n.8.
48. Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 756 (3d Cir. 1974).
49. 67 F.R.D. 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
50. Id. at 483. While the court held this should be sufficient, the questions certi-
fied to the court of appeals were more specific. See also In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig. v.
Touche Ross & Co., 69 F.R.D. 24 (S.D. Cal. 1975) holding the same.
51. 544 F.2d 1364 (7th Cir. 1976).
5991
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ary. The trial court denied class action certification. On appeal, the
court of appeals cited with approval the use of section 1292(b) in lim-
ited situations where the trial court determines that substantial grounds
for difference of opinion on the class status question exists and immedi-
ate appeal may materially advance the end of litigation. 2
Mandamus
The All Writs Act 5 3 provides another possible alternative for re-
viewing class standing determinations. Mandamus is labeled as one of
the "most potent weapons in the judicial arsenal"54 and accordingly its
use is limited to cases where there has been a showing of an abuse of
judicial power.55
In Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,56 the Securities and Ex-
change Commission filed a complaint for injunctive relief against Occi-
dental Petroleum alleging violations of specific sections of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act. Based on the allegations of the SEC complaint
numerous private actions were filed. After extensive briefing, the dis-
trict judge entered an order certifying a class under rule 23(b)(1) and
23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.5" The district judge
52. Id. at 1369.
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970).
54. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 107 (1967).
55. Id. at 104.
56. 541 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1976).
57. Suits brought under 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure have to meet the initial prerequisites of a class action. 23(b)(1) suits will be
allowed when:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of
the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual mem-
bers of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct
for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other
members not parties to the adjudications or substanially impair or impede
their ability to protect their interests;
Id.
23(b)(3) suits would be appropriate where "the court finds that the questions of law or
fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
8
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refused to certify the ruling on the class certification under 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b). The Ninth Circuit addressed the latter question first and held
it was an inappropriate remedy to mandamus the district judge to exer-
cise his discretion to certify a question under section 1292(b). Relying
on earlier opinions of the Second and Eighth Circuits the court con-
cluded that to issue the writ instructing a district judge to certify a
question under section 1292(b) would circumvent the statutory require-
ment that the district court and the court of appeals agree on the pro-
priety of such an appeal.58
As to certification of the class suit the court held that mandamus
was inappropriate as to the 23(b)(3) class certification. The court ac-
cepted the district court judge's discretion in the certification. The
court did, however, issue the writ as to the certification under rule
23(b)(1). After determining certification was improper the court con-
cluded judicial efficiency required the issuance of the writ to correct the
improper certification.59
Mandamus has also been used to review orders granting class ac-
tion status to determine if the lower court acted beyond its power au-
thorized by the rule. In Schmidt v. Fuller Brush Co.,60 Schmidt
brought an action on behalf of himself and others similarly situated
alleging that they were employed by Fuller Brush Company and that
Fuller Brush had failed to pay them minimum wages and overtime
compensation allegedly required under the Fair Labor Standards Act."1
After certifying the class, the district judge directed that notice be sent
to the absent class members as required by rule 23. Under rule
23(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless a class mem-
ber comes forward and asks to be excluded from the suit he will be
bound by the judgment. On the otherhand, section 16(b) of the Fair
Labor Standards Act provides that an employee must consent in writ-
ing to be a party plaintiff. The court concluded that these two provi-
sions were irreconcilable and issued mandamus vacating class action
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy . . . ." Id.
Suits brought under 23(b)(3) have notice requirements not found in 23(b)(1) suits.
58. Green, 541 F.2d at 1337.
59. Id. at 1339.
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order.6 2
The continuing viability of mandamus even in these limited situa-
tions has been thrown into question after the Supreme Court decisions
of Coopers6 3 and Gardner.4 While not specifically addressing the issue
of mandamus, the Court's attitude toward class actions may lead one to
suspect they have closed the "back door" as well as the front one to
any appeals of class action standing prior to final judgment.
Class Actions in Florida
The new Florida class action rule," patterned after the federal
rule,6 went into effect January 1, 1980. While the language varies in
many respects, the basic requirements for bringing a class suit are simi-
lar. The Florida rule contains detailed pleading requirements not found
in Federal Rule 23.17 Additionally, the notice requirements in Florida's
rule are more explicit and stringent than in its federal counterpart.6 8
Under the federal rule, a judge initially determines whether the
suit may proceed as a class action. If it may, the judge certifies the
class. If not, the judge denies certification and the suit proceeds. Under
the Florida rule, a judge has the same option but, additionally, the
judge may strike the class allegations.6 9 Two questions then arise: what
is the legal significance attached to striking the class representation al-
legations? and what prompts striking?
Prior to the adoption of the new Florida rule, the Florida Supreme
Court decided Harrell v. Hess Oil & Chem. Corp.70 That case involved
a complaint in the form of a class action. The trial court dismissed the
entire complaint because it was improperly brought as a class action.
The Florida Spreme Court held that where the complaint stated an
individual claim which could withstand a motion to dismiss, it was im-
62. Id. at 536.
63. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
64. Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 437 U.S. 478 (1978).
65. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220.
66. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
67. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(c).
68. Id. at advisory committee note.
69. Compare FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(d)(1) with FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c).
70. 287 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1973).
10
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proper to dismiss the complaint. "Rather, the trial court could have
treated those allegations relating solely to a class action suit as having
been stricken from the complaint by ordering dismissal of the com-
plaint insofar as a class action was asserted." 71 Other courts have re-
peatedly held that misjoinder of parties is not a basis for dismissal.7 2
'Since an order striking class allegations is not the equivalent of a dis-
missal against the individual representative, that representative should
not be allowed to appeal the order prior to final judgment.73 Under the
Florida Supreme Court approach, the striking of class allegations is
analogous to dismissal, thus arguably a final judgment as to the absent
class members.74 However, the rule provides that orders "[m]ay be
conditional and may be altered or amended before entry of judgment
on the merits of the action. ' 5 If this language is read to mean that a
judge is free to change his mind during the course of the trial and
reinstate the class allegations, the order is not final as to the class but
interlocutory. As an interlocutory order, it can only be appealable if it
falls within the scope of Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130 or
if a district court grants a common-law writ of certiorari.
Class Standing Determinations as Final Judgments in Florida
In Florida, absent a contrary statute or rule of court, appeals will
lie only from final judgments or decrees. 0 Class standing orders have
been held not to be final judgments under Florida law. 77
Prior to the adoption of the new Florida class action rule, the First
71. Id. at 295.
72. Id. at 294. See also Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Fuller, 275 So. 2d
568, 569 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973), and Gordon Fin. Co. v. Belzaguy, 216 So. 2d
240, 245 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
73. This does not take into account remedies such as mandamus, common law
certiorari, or interlocutory appeal under jurisdiction over the person.
74. Harrell, 287 So. 2d at 295.
75. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(2)(1).
76. Brannon v. Johnson, 83 So. 2d 779, 780 (Fla. 1955).
77. Ero Properties, Inc. v. Cone, 395 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
National Lake Dev., Inc. v. Lake Tippecanoe Owners Ass'n, 395 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Palm Beach Towers, Inc. v. Korn, 400 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1981); American Heritage Inst. Sec., Inc. v. Price, 379 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
11
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District Court of Appeal decided Cordell v. World Insurance Co.78 The
court held the dismissal of a class action suit with prejudice a final
order even though plaintiffs were entitled to file an amended complaint
and pursue claims in their individual capacity. The order was final as
to the proposed class even though it did not finally dispose of the case
on the merits."9
With the new provision allowing the judge to strike class allega-
tions, question arises as to whether it is permissible to dismiss an action
that fails to meet the prerequisites of a class but does state an individ-
ual cause of action. While there is no authority under the new rule, the
courts are likely to strike the class allegations in accordance with the
rule, rather than entirely dismiss the complaint. The only time dismis-
sal would be appropriate would be when the plaintiff has stated no
claim for himself in which case dismissal would be a final judgment
and appeal should be granted as a matter of right.
Appeal of Class Standing Determinations in Florida When
Multiple Parties are Involved
There is no corresponding rule in Florida to rule 54(b) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. s" Accordingly, there is no rule that
renders final a split judgment in a case involving multiple parties.8'
Moreover, Florida has a strong policy against piecemeal review.82
Therefore, appealability of an order dismissing less than all the parties
will turn on the grounds of the dismissal.
The general rule in equity is that an order that dismisses one party
(or which disposes of the claims of that party) is final and appealable
as to the dismissed party.83 The modern approach to actions at law is
that these too should be immediately appealable.8 4
78. 352 So. 2d 108 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
79. Id. at 109.
80. See supra pp. 8-9.
81. Evin R. Welsh & Co. v. Johnson, 138 So. 2d 390, 391 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1962).
82. S.L.T. Warehouse Co. v. Webb, 304 So. 2d 97, 99 (Fla. 1974).
83. Evin R. Welch & Co., 138 So. 2d at 391. See also Shute v. Keystone State
Bank, 159 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
84. Evin R. Welch & Co., 138 So. 2d at 394. See also Schneider v. Manheimere,
12
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In Conboy v. City of Naples,5 Vincent H. Conboy brought a class
action suit in equity on behalf of himself and all other ad valorem tax
payers residing in the City of Naples. The action named the City of
Naples, its Tax Assessor, the State Controller, and two land develop-
ment concerns as the defendants. Conboy asserted that for the year of
1966 the lands owned by these development concerns were greatly un-
derassessed. Therefore, claimed Conboy, all lands in the City of Naples
did not bear their just burden of taxation which resulted in an increase
of taxes to the class. The trial judge entered a directed verdict in favor
of one of the land development concerns. An order enacted "final judg-
ment" was recorded in favor of the land concern. Six months later the
entire case was disposed of against the class. The issue was whether the
initial directed verdict in favor of the first land development concern
was an interlocutory order or whether the directed verdict was a final
judgment requiring appellate review. The Second District Court of Ap-
peal ruled that in a class action, dismissal of one of the defendants was
final as to him and appeal must be taken when the action was dis-
missed against that defendant and not when the entire suit was
decided.8 6
Class Standing Appeals as Interlocutory Orders in Florida
Prior to the change in the interlocutory order appeal rule, deci-
sions on whether a suit could proceed as a class action were the subject
of appeal to the Florida district courts.8 7 These interlocutory orders
were appealable under Florida Appellate Rule of Procedure 4.2, which
provided: "Appeals may be prosecuted in accordance with this rule
from interlocutory orders in civil actions which, from the subject mat-
ter or relief sought are such as formerly were cognizable in equity...
."" Equity has long held that one or more persons may sue or defend
on behalf of others with common interests when it is impractical to
170 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
85. 226 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., Rosenwasser v. Frager, 307 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1975); Hendler v. Rogues House Condominium, Inc., 234 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1970).
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bring all before the court.89 Since the replacement of rule 4.2 there is
no longer immediate appellate review of interlocutory orders "formerly
cognizable in equity."' 0 As a result, to be appealable as an interlocu-
tory order, class determinations must fall within one of the categories
of non-final orders from which immediate appeal will lie.
The present rule specifically limits review on non-final orders91 to
include orders involving injunctive relief,92 orders which determine the
issue of liability in favor of the claimant,93 and orders which determine
jurisdiction over the person.94
A. Injunctions
The Florida rule allowing interlocutory appeal concerning injunc-
tions95 is almost identical to the federal statute.96 As pointed out in
Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 97 the considerations for a
class action are completely different from the considerations for grant-
ing or denying injunctions. 98 While the denial of class certification may
affect the possible scope of an injunction, it will not have any effect on
whether the petitioner is entitled to such an injunction. Yet, Florida
courts are free to disregard the Gardner decision and allow immediate
appeal of class standing determinations which involve the request for
an injunction. The Florida rule allows interlocutory appeal of orders
involving injunctive relief. When read literally, however, the rule ex-
cludes orders of class standing. Yet, as was conceded by the United
States Supreme Court, such orders may indirectly affect injunctive re-
lief.99 Whether Florida courts decide to allow such interlocutory review
of class standing orders remains to be seen. If circumstances arise
where the class standing determination would affect the merits of the
89. 379 So. 2d 420, 421 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
90. FLA. R. APP. P. 4.2.
91. Id. at 9.130(a)(3).
92. Id. at 9.130(a)(3)(B).
93. Id. at 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iv).
94. Id. at 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i).
95. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.130(a)(3)(B).
96. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1970).
97. 437 U.S. 478 (1978).
98. Id. at 480.
99. Id.
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petitioner's own claim or pass on the legal sufficiency of any claims for
injunctive relief, appellate 'review under the injunction section should
be allowed.
B. Orders that Determine the Issue of Liability in Favor of the
Claimant
Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that a non-final or-
der which determines "the issue of liability in favor of a party seeking
affirmative relief" is immediately appealable.100 In American Heritage
Institutional Securities v. Price,10' appellants filed an interlocutory ap-
peal of the trial court's order denying appellants motion to strike and
motion for judgment on the pleadings. Both motions were directed as to
whether the cause of action stated in the complaint could be prosecuted
as a class action. Appellants argued jurisdiction under
9.130(a)(3)(C)(iv) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure which
states, "Review of non-final orders of lower tribunals is limited to those
which. . . determine. . the issue of liability in favor of a party seek-
ing affirmative relief." The Fifth District Court of Appeal rejected this
contention. It held that in determining class standing, the court is judg-
ing whether a cause can appropriately be brought as a class suit or
whether there are sufficient allegations to sustain a class suit. 102 Once
this determindtion is made, the suit will then proceed toward a poten-
tial liability which has not been determined and may never be
determined.10 3
The reasoning for this determination is sound since the subject of
liability is not relevant to a class determination. Class standing deter-
minations only decide who is participating in the lawsuit, not who is
liable.
C. Orders that Determine Jurisdiction Over the Person
Thus far, the only way recognized by a Florida appellate court to
appeal a class standing determination as an interlocutory order has
100. FLA. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iv).
101. 379 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
102. Id. at 421.
103. Id.
15
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been as a non-final order which determines jurisdiction over the person.
In Kohl v. Bay Colony Club Condominium, Inc.,"0 4 the trial court had
entered certain pre-trial orders including the determinaton that a class
action suit could be maintained. The petitioner filed a petition for certi-
orari to have this ruling reviewed and the Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal allowed an appeal. The appellate court held that since a class ac-
tion was binding on all members of the class, the court obtained
personal jurisdiction over them. As a result, these were orders that de-
termined jurisdiction over the person and fell within this section of im-
mediately appealable interlocutory orders.
The idea of interlocutory appeal based on jurisdiction over the per-
son. was emphatically rejected by the Second District Court of Appeal
in National Lake Developments, Inc. v. Lake Tippecanoe Owners As-
soc. 105 The court held that orders of class determination decide the
makeup of the proper class, not whether the court has jurisdiction over
the members of the class.' 06 Court policy reasons alone were held suffi-
cient to reject the Kohl view since acceptance of its rationale could lead
to interlocutory appeal in all class suits. 10 7 This was something the Sec-
ond District Court of Appeal did not believe the drafters of the appel-
late rules would have deemed proper under orders that determine juris-
diction over the person. 0
The reason that immediate interlocutory appeal for jurisdiction
over the person is allowed under the appellate rules is to eliminate use-
less labor. 09 This reason should be focused upon when trying to deter-
mine if class standing orders should be immediately appealable as in-
terlocutory orders determining jurisdiction over the person. It is
apparent that if one accepts the premise that class standing orders do
determine jurisdiction over the person then all such orders are or would
be immediately appealable. To allow this would create labor for the
district courts as clearly the party that had the adverse class ruling
may take an immediate appeal regardless of its merits. Yet, to make
the parties go through the time and expense of a complete trial only to
104. 385 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
105. 395 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
106. Id. at 593.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.130 advisory committee note.
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have the initial class determination reversed at the appellate level
would circumvent the purpbse of the appellate rules.
While this is a reason for allowing class standing orders to be im-
mediately appealable, the ramifications of doing so under jurisdiction
over the person will lead to both useless labor and a form of piecemeal
review. Although there is always the possibility of a judge making an
erroneous initial determination, such determination is subject to
amendment or alteration at anytime prior to final judgment on the
merits.110 In cases of clear error there may be a possibility of a writ of
mandamus or common law certiorari. If neither of those remedies work
then there still is appeal after final judgment.
From the standpoint of useless labor, it becomes a choice between
"floodgate" review for all class standing determinations or the isolated
case where an erroneous decision is initially made and remains un-
changed throughout the trial with no way to rectify it until final review.
In that light, policy reasons dictate that the courts of Florida reject
class standing determinations as determining jurisdiction over the
person.
Jurisdiction over the person is the power to determine an action
because the parties are lawfully before the court."" When defining ju-
risdiction over the person, Florida courts have included such things as
service of process or applicability of the long arm statute to non-re-
sidents.11 2 In Atreco-Florida, Inc. v. Berliner,'" the Fourth District
Court of Appeal held jurisdiction over the person to be limited to these
types of considerations. 14 In so holding, the court refused to review an
order which determined class status." 5 However, in Kohl, the Fourth
District retreated from this limited view and extended the definition of
jurisdiction over the person for purposes of the appellate rule.116
The issue to be resolved is whether approval or denial of certifica-
tion of a class is an order determining jurisdiction over the person. In a
110. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220.
111. National Lake Dev., Inc., 395 So. 2d at 593.
112. American Health Ass'n v. Helprin, 357 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1978).
113. 360 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. 385 So. 2d at 1029.
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class action suit, all members of the class will be bound by the court's
final judgment. In this respect, the court is asserting jurisdiction over
all members of the class. But, the right to challenge personal jurisdic-
tion has traditionally been reserved to the person over whom the court
is asserting jurisdiction.1 17 The Florida class action rule provides meth-
ods which allow members of the class to exclude themselves from the
court's jurisdiction.118 These provisions of the rule protect the absent
class members. Those class members who do not exclude themselves
waive their objections to the court taking jurisdiction over them.
Mandamus as a Method of Reviewing Class Standing
Determinations in Florida
Just as mandamus has been extremely limited at the federal level
when dealing with class standing orders, it is equally limited in Florida.
The Florida Constitution119 and the Florida Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure"O empower the courts to issue writs of mandamus. For a writ of
mandamus to be issued, the act commanded by the writ must be minis-
terial.1 21 This writ may be used to command an officer to exercise his
discretion, but not to exercise it in a particular way. 22
While mandamus should not lie to review all class determinations,
in certain instances mandamus review should be allowed. The discre-
tion which mandamus does not control is the one the law has vested in
the judge. When the judge abuses his discretion to a point that
amounts to a failure to do the act as the law requires, mandamus is
proper. 23 For example, the Florida rule requires the court to submit an
order stating the findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which the
determination is made.1 24 Where such findings are totally inconsistent
with the class status order, discretionary abuse is apparent, and manda-
117. National Lake Dev., Inc., 395 So. 2d at 593.
118. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(d)(2).
119. FLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 3(b)(8), 4(b)(3), 5(b).
120. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030(a)(3), (b)(3), (c)(3).
121. State ex rel. Zuckerman-Veron Corp. v. City of Miramar, 306 So. 2d 173,
175 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
122. Green v. Waiter, 161 So. 2d 830, 834 (Fla. 1964).
123. Permenter v. Younan, 31 So. 2d 387, 390 (Fla. 1947).
124. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(d)(1).
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mus should be issued.
Common Law Certiorari to Review Class Standing Orders
An existing method which allows for immediate review of an oth-
erwise non-reviewable order is the common law writ of certiorari.125
Certiorari is a writ issued by a superior court to a lower tribunal exer-
cising a judicial or quasi-judicial function.12 6 Whether certiorari is a
workable structure to allow review of these orders will depend on how
liberally it is granted.
The general rule is that certiorari will be issued only when a lower
court order, if allowed to stand, may cause material injury to the peti-
tioner throughout the proceedings and later appeal would be inade-
quate.127 There is at least an argument that the "death-knell" rationale
should be used to grant review of some denials of class certifications.
For example, where the plaintiff would not pursue his claims individu-
ally, denial of class suit participation may lead to material injury.
Kohl came to the Fourth District Court of Appeals by way of peti-
tion for writ of common law certiorari.12 8 In rejecting the petition the
court said, "[i]t has not been demonstrated either that the trial court
exceeded its jurisdiction or that the essential requirements of law and
due process have been violated."12 9 Implicit in this statement is the fact
that if a petitioner can demonstrate either of the above prerequisites,
certiorari would be granted to review class orders.
Failure to observe the essential requirements of law has been in-
terpreted to mean the commission of an error so fundamental in nature
as to render the judgment void.130 Yet in Everglades Protective Syndi-
cate, Inc. v. Makinney,1 31 the Fourth District Court of Appeal granted
125. See generally Haddad, Common Law Writ of Certiorari in Florida, 29 U.
FLA. L. REV. 207 (1977).
126. Simmons v. Owen, 87 Fla. 485, 100 So. 735 (1924).
127. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Hill, 388 So. 2d 648, 650 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1980).
128. Kohl v. Bay Colony Club Condominium, Inc., 385 So. 2d 1028, 1029 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
129. Id.
130. Jacksonville, T. & K.W. Ry. v. Boy, 34 Fla. 389, 16 So. 190 (1894).
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certiorari and quashed a motion to compel discovery. Makinney was
expelled from membership in The Everglades Club, a private social
club. He filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Palm Beach
Circuit Court seeking to compel the club to reinstate his membership.
Makinney served the club with written interrogatories. The club an-
swered some but refused to answer others on the grounds they were
irrelevant and immaterial to any issue in the action. A motion to com-
pel was granted by the trial court whereupon the club filed a petition
for common-law certiorari.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the interrogatories
neither consisted of questions relevant to the subject matter involved in
the litigation nor were they "reasonably calculated to lead to the dis-
covery of admissible evidence." 13 2 This was sufficient to depart from
the essential requirements of law. While answering irrelevant questions
in interirogations is'an inconvenience, the answers to the questions also
have no bearing on the outcome of the suit. In this respect, it appears
that a liberal interpretation of departing from the essential require-
ments of the law has been used. In a liberal setting it appears clear that
there will arise cases where a sympathetic district court could grant a
petition for certiorari and indeed change a class standing
determination.
To obtain review of a class standing determination by common law
certiorari, the petitioner must show that the judge's decision was erro-
neous when compared to the class action rule. The wasting of judicial
time and expense associated with a second trial has been held insuffi-
cient justification for issuance of the writ.13 Indeed, mere expedi-
ency134 has not formed a basis for review by certiorari.
In Schever v. Wille,'35 plaintiff sought common law certiorari after
the trial court granted defendant's motion to strike plaintiff's prayer for
punitive damages but where the case was still pending on the issue of
132. Id. at 263.
133. Bowl Am. Fla., Inc. v. Schmit, 386 So. 2d 1203 (Fla.-5th Dist. Ct. App.
1980); Ford Motor Co. v. Nelson, 355 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1980);
Professional Medical Specialties, Inc. v. Renfroe, 362 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1978); Whiteside v. Johnson, 351 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977);
Siegel v. Abramowitz, 309 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
134. Schever v. Wille, 370 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
135. Id.
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actual damages. In dismissing his petition, the court said: "[I]t is cer-
tainly not impossible that such a trial would finally resolve this case.
Plaintiff may not prevail in the case . . . or the parties may in some
fashion settle their differences and all issues will then be removed from
the court's consideration." '36 The identical rationale could be used in
the class action setting. If class certification is granted to the plaintiffs,
there is no reason to assume that the defendant will lose the suit or
decide to settle the case rather than litigate. Additionally, if defendant
does lose the case, appeal will include the determination of whether the
class suit was proper. Unquestionably inconvenient to the defendant to
wait, review is available to him eventually. The same is equally true for
the denial of class certification to the plaintiff.
It should be noted that in the commentary to the appellate rules,
the advisory committee stated that they did not intend to abolish the
common law writ of certiorari.137 Yet, they recognized that due to the
heavy burden on the petitioner, it would be extremely rare that errone-
ous interlocutory orders could be corrected by resorting to common law
certiorari. 13 8 Perhaps, class standing orders may find their way into
that extremely rare category the advisory committee had in mind.
Conclusion
Class standing determinations are not presently appealable as a
final judgment. As a matter of law, this judgment is sound. Prerequi-
sites to maintaining class actions do not theoretically address the merits
of a claim. These prerequisites are a procedural device and unless the
complaint is actually dismissed, a judge is free to amend or alter his or
her decision at any time prior to final judgment on the merits.13 9 With
the new rule allowing for striking of class allegations there will be very
few cases where a complaint is actually dismissed. If dismissal is
granted, immediate appeal should be allowed as a final judgment.
If the judge strikes the class allegations, this order is final as to the
class. Yet, it is unlikely that immediate appeal will be allowed. Since
this order would not dismiss the complaint as to the individual plaintiff,
136. Id. at 1166.
137. FLA. R. App. P. 9.130 advisory committee note.
138. Id.
139. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(d)(1).
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the entire lawsuit would probably have to run its course before appeal
will be allowed.
While discretionary interlocutory appeals may be heard at the fed-
eral level, 140 Florida has no comparable rule or statute. To be heard as
an interlocutory appeal, an order must fall into one of the specific cate-
gories laid down by the rule. Orders concerning injunctive relief ordina-
rily are not allowed as a vehicle for review of class standing orders.
While such class standing orders may influence the scope of the injunc-
tion, the requirements for obtaining injunctive relief do not involve the
same considerations as class standing determinations. Unless the merits
of petitioner's own claim would be affected or the order passes on the
legal sufficiency of a claim for injunctive relief, this coat-tail review
should not be allowed.
Appeal by means of non-final orders which determine the issue of
liability in favor of the claimant has equally been unacceptable for re-
view of class standing determinations. Class determinations will show
who is participating in the lawsuit, not who, if anyone, is liable. In
isolated situations where a class standing determination would deter-
mine liability, such appeals will obviously be allowed.
Jurisdiction over the person as a basis for immediate appeal seems
unsound yet if the Florida Supreme .Court wishes immediate appeala-
bility of such interlocutory determinations, this may be the only way to
accomplish the task. Under that rationale all class standing determina-
tions would be reviewable. This was a concern which led the United
States Supreme Court to reject the "death-knell" doctrine. Such indis-
criminate review would circumvent judicial economy and lead to piece-
meal review. This, Florida courts have long been opposed to, thus it is
likely the Florida Supreme Court will reject the approach.
A liberal view of the writ of common law certiorari may allow
appeals of class denials under the death-knell rationale. Yet it seems
probable that this liberal view will not be accepted and this writ will be
unavailable in all but the most exceptional cases.
As a final resort, mandamus is available in cases where there has
been a clear showing of usurpation of judicial discretion. This remedy
is available for improper class certification as well as improper denial
of certification.
140. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
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Orders which determine whether a suit may proceed as a class
action should not be immediately appealable in all cases. At the present
time the Florida courts are not in a position to use their discretion.
Orders of this nature will either have to be immediately appealable or
none may be appealed. What would seem vital to effective class action
suits in Florida is some change in the appellate policy. A revision of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure incorporating Federal Statute 1292(b) is
needed. Since this is a form of procedure, the Florida Supreme Court
should be able to make this necessary adoption.
Such an addition to rule 9.130 could be added as (a)(3)(D) and
might read...
(a)(3) "Review of non-final orders of lower tribunals is limited to
those which:" '
(D) involve a controlling question of law which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinions, and an immediate appeal may
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. These
appeals will be heard only upon the certification of a Circuit Court
judge and acceptance by the District Court.""
This addition would allow the Florida courts the right to hear immedi-
ate class standing appeals in cases where immediate review would ef-
fectuate Florida's litigation policies.
Janice Seamon
141. FLA. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3).
142. This suggestion is patterned after 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
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